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Why Global Law is Transnational 
Remarks on the Symposium around William 







Professor William Twining loves puzzles. And he is fine that his energy is spent 
on puzzles of which he will probably never have all the pieces. The point seems 
to be the act of puzzling itself, the identification of pieces and the appreciation 
of their shape in an attempt to understand their place in the bigger picture. In 
that vein, he observes the subjects of his scholarship not only through books but 
through his own perception, involvement and experience. His scholarly work and 
academic teaching have taken him practically everywhere, engaging with the 
world, and with concepts and conundra, with a particular sense of modesty, 
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humility and irony. For example, in his Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture, 
delivered in 2009 at Duke Law School, Professor Twining presented himself as 
the founder—and, so far, as the only member—of a ‘new school of 
jurisprudence’, namely ‘the self-critical legal studies movement’. He also 
acknowledged that—like all academic lawyers today—he found himself to be 
a‘comparatist not by specialization, but by situation’.1 There are two, at least two, 
references in here: one is to Roberto Unger’s article in the Harvard Law Review 
on ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’, which was later published in book 
form,2 and another is to Karl Llewellyn’s notion of the ‘situation sense’.3 This 
recent reference to academic lawyers being comparatists ‘by situation’, however, 
appears to identify the context in which these lawyers are arguably operating 
today. For Professor Twining, these situations are, for better or worse, described 
as or associated with ‘so-called “globalisation”’. The defining nature of these 
situations, for him, is that they are ones of pluralism—a wide field of study, both 
in theory and practice, in law and non-law, areas and demarcations to which 
Professor Twining has devoted an enormous amount of time and attention.4 
Against this background he notes, in his 2009 seminal monograph General 
Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective: ‘If one is 
interested in the relations between municipal law and other normative orders 
there are conceptual problems however one defines or conceptualises law. The 
definitional stop is only one of several problems in this area, most of which are 
unlikely to be resolved by conceptual analysis or formal definitions alone.’5 In 
the text that informs the present Symposium before us today, he writes: ‘The 
problem of the “definitional stop”— where to draw the line between legal and 
non-legal, if one adopts a broad conception of law—has re-surfaced in the 
context of debates about legal pluralism. This is not a specific puzzle about 
legal pluralism as such, but is part of the perennial topic of how best to 
conceptualise law.’6 
In his Bernstein Lecture, he gave an elaborate account of the different, 
divergent and competing conceptions as well as realities of pluralism, never 
losing sight of the fact that ‘when lawyers hear about legal pluralism many are 
puzzled, even resistant to the idea’.7 For Professor Twining, the discussion of 
pluralism—on the one hand, as a social fact that concerns actually existing 
normative orders that bind human behaviour and, on the other, as a challenge to 
legal theory and, as such, to the very understanding and definition of what 
should properly be called law and what shouldn’t—must be at the centre of 
our engagements with the consequences of globalisation for law. He notes how 
‘[i]t is fairly obvious that the main puzzles are to do with the what counts as 
“legal” (rather than what is plural) and that nearly all writing about legal 
pluralism adopts or presupposes a broad conception of law that extends the 
“Westphalian Duo” of the municipal or domestic law of sovereign states and 
public international law conceived as dealing with relations between such 
states’8 before observing, a little later, that ‘[p]uzzles about the concept of 
law, positivism, and other general issues in normative and legal theory are an 
unavoidable part of the backdrop of the study of legal pluralism. The topic 
becomes significant when one adopts a broad conception of law and treats 
concepts such as institutionalized normative orders or systems or sets of rules 
as meaningful. From that perspective legal pluralism is a normal and near-
universal phenomenon.’9 Professor Twining’s engagement with pluralism must 
be seen as part of a larger picture in which we find laid out some of the most 
pressing challenges for social, economic and political order today—as seen 
through the lens of law. It is here that he displays one of his strongest and most 
admirable characteristics—an impressive and inspiring combination of 
intellectual curiosity with a seemingly inexhaustible energy to approach and to 
engage with what others have thought, written and said and to listen to them. 
What we find here, and what is so equally forcefully illustrated by his 
comprehensive response to the contributors to our Symposium, is the generosity 
with which he engages with the work, the ideas, even the flaws, of others. It is 
also this generosity through which others are being placed at the centre of 
attention, in order to be pulled into a conversation the goal of which never 
appears to be the establishment of who is ‘wrong’ or who is ‘right’, but— 
throughout—the pursuit of something grander. At the same time, the Montesquieu 
Lecture, which forms the starting point of this Symposium, is clearly addressed 
to legal scholars of all convictions, whether or not they understand themselves 
as doctrinalists or theorists, as globalisation scholars or teachers of domestic 
law. One of the lecture’s best achievements is to present the challenges of 
globalisation processes for law in an accessible and informative, yet never over-
simplifying manner. While it provides us with an eye-opening introduction to 
many of the currently found contentions among lawyers and social theorists 
investigating the impact of globalisation and transnationalisation processes, it 
contains numerous references to further reading and thought, inviting us to 
enter into the debate. 
The success of such a presentation depends, crucially, on the ability of a 
scholar to consciously move back and forth between his (or her) own 
assumptions and starting points and those of others. So, it is neither surprising 
nor presumptuous when Professor Twining, as mentioned earlier, holds 
himself out as the founder (and only member) of the self-critical legal 
studies movement. Twining’s impressive scholarship reflects his curiosity for 
the many complex forms of social orders and the place and role of law 
within those. It furthermore reveals him as a scholar who engages with the 





In Professor Twining’s work the challenge of pluralism occupies a central place 
in the rich and sophisticated scholarly landscape of which he is a most avid 
and diligent gardener—and architect. This deserves particular emphasis and 
recognition, as it helps to contextualise the Montesquieu Lecture which he 
gave in 2009 at Tilburg Law School. This context itself, however, we might 
say, is the central topic and preoccupation of his lecture. The title of the lecture 
becomes the key to unlocking the context. By choosing the theme of 
‘globalisation and legal scholarship’, Professor Twining engages not only with 
the ways in which lawyers have been seeking to adequately identify and respond 
to the challenges of a globalising world, but, in addition, how this theoretical 
work may translate back into legal education and curriculum reform. Both 
globalisation and scholarship deserve our attention today and have done so, as 
Professor Twining notes regarding the former, for at least 30 years. Throughout 
that period, scholars—in law as well as in other disciplines—have been 
engaging with the definition, analysis and even affirmation or rejection of their 
object of study. ‘Globalisation’ has brought about a particular breed of scholar, 
teacher, academic—all of whom find themselves engaged in so-called 
‘globalisation studies’. Professor Twining never just ‘buys’ a thing (idea, 
concept, claim), but turns it over, squeezes it and holds it against the light from 
different angles in order to both gain distance from it and create the possibility 
of seeing it through someone else’s eyes, against different backgrounds, 
assumptions, beliefs and traditions.10 He astutely identifies globalisation as not 
being a simple given, but a historical (socio-economic, political, cultural) 
condition as well as a framework of analysis. This is a crucial move because it 
allows us to see the inevitability of its impact on the ‘other’ side of the equation, 
namely legal scholarship. If globalisation challenges different disciplinary 
frameworks in a fundamental way, and if one of the consequences of this 
challenge and of the various forms in which scholars (but also activists,11 
amongst others12) have responded to it, is the approximation and 
interpenetration of different disciplinary approaches, then it will be 
unavoidable to ask to what degree lawyers and legal scholars must begin to 
think in an interdisciplinary fashion.13 
But, how should this be done? It appears as if the centrality of (normative 
and legal) pluralism in our current efforts to study the globalisation challenges 
for law presents a strong argument in favour of a multiand interdisciplinary 
approach. Whether it is the analysis of the function and operation of non-state 
norms in domestic and religious as well as associational settings14 or of 
transnational regimes of global regulatory governance,15 it has become 
increasingly obvious that a legal analysis needs to draw on insights from 
sociologists, anthropologists, economic and social geographers, to name just a 
few. This is the other side of the pair in the title ‘globalisation and legal 
scholarship’, which depicts the topic of Professor Twining’s lecture. His is a 
forceful reminder of how deeply embedded legal analysis is in a much bigger 
scholarly enterprise to make sense of this world. His own scholarship over the 
years attests to his acknowledgement of a need to constantly call into question 
and, eventually, to revise, adapt or scrap one’s starting assumptions. For a 
largely state-based legal theory, the transnationalisation of regulatory regimes, 
whatever label we choose to apply from public to private, national or 
international to transnational, poses enormous challenges.16 But, from the 
perspective of a legal theory that is opening itself up for an interdisciplinary 
investigation into the nature of emerging global orders, the messy, pluralist 
regimes present an important opportunity. The ‘spatialisation’ of regulatory 
frameworks on the transnational scale prompts (or should prompt17) a 
conceptual and theoretical engagement that ‘naturally’ breaks down and 
redraws disciplinary boundaries,18 meanwhile harking back to earlier work in 
legal pluralism in an attempt to continue to interrogate the relationship 
between differently conceived spheres of social ordering.19 As Professor 
Twining repeatedly emphasises, the line-drawing in the context of legal 
pluralism is not one of empirical observation but of qualification, which 
ultimately makes it a matter of choice.20 With the recognition of a norm as 
‘law’ comes the challenge of justifying this recognition. At that point, it is no 





More or less just before the half-way point of his lecture, Professor Twining 
provides his readers with a most telling overview of the themes that he has 
‘identified inductively in over ten years of thinking about globalisation and 
law and general jurisprudence’.22 These are the following: 
 
• the whole Western tradition of academic law is based on several kinds of 
assumptions that need to be critically examined in a changing context; 
• we lack concepts and data to generalise about legal phenomena in the world as a 
whole: analytic concepts that can transcend, at least to some extent, different 
legal traditions and cultures; 
• comparison is the first step to generalisation and more sophisticated and 
expansive approaches to comparative law are critical for the development of 
a healthy discipline of law; 
• we need more sophisticated normative theories that are well-informed and 
sensitive to pluralism of beliefs and differences between value systems; and, 
especially, we need improved empirical understandings of how legal doctrines, 
institutions and practices operate in ‘the real world’.23 
 
It would be difficult to dismiss any of the above five points on the basis that 
they are irrelevant or trivial. Rather, each and every theme identified by 
Professor Twining captures a wider range of concerns which refer back to 
law’s (longstanding) identity and construction problems. What makes the 
lecture such a rich source of insights as well as an invitation to further 
investigation is his diligent and thought provoking engagement with the 
identified themes in the continuation of the presentation. 
The contributions to the following Symposium engage, each in their own 
way, with one or more of these contentions. In the context of this brief 
introduction, my aim has been to contextualise his project and to draw out 
these themes a little more, with the goal of underlining their explanatory 
quality and merit. As concerns the first theme, we have here an illustration of 
Twining’s ‘self-critical’ approach in that he echoes and hints at what others 
have formulated as a claim to ‘provincialize Europe’24 in order to open up the 
space of recognising other histories, trajectories and patterns of social, political 
and cultural order. Given the centrality of the state and its legacy in both 
defining and embedding law within the Western legal imagination,25 it is with 
particular urgency and justification that authors have been raising claims to de-
centre, shift or otherwise ‘provincialise’ these assumptions today.26 Arguably, 
comparative law has become one of the central battlegrounds—or, perhaps, 
construction sites, however you wish to approach the issue—for a serious 
reconsideration of state-centrism on the one hand and of the quality of non-
state law as a historical element of any state legal order on the other. 
Regardless of where one’s legal scholarship is primarily focused, it appears 
that it has become increasingly difficult to either disregard or avoid 
comparative perspectives. 
 
[T]oday no scholar, or even student, of law can focus solely on the domestic law of 
a single jurisdiction … We are in an important sense all comparatists now, even 
if most of us lack sophistication in comparative method. Comparative law is 
increasingly more like a way of life than a marginal subject for a few specialists. 
The processes of transnationalisation significantly increase this trend.27 
 
 
This claim, however, raises a host of questions as to the methodology of 
practising,28 adjudicating,29 even teaching30 the emerging legal pluralism of 
comparative transnational31 law. Professor Twining alerts us to the risk of 
separating the obvious contenders for transnational or global law such as 
public international law or the law of international trade and finance from the 
otherwise ‘domestic’, ‘less obvious’ subjects (‘contracts, criminal law, family 
law, intellectual property, and labour law’). Regarding the latter, he observes 
a ‘growing emphasis on the transnational dimensions’ of these areas of 
instruction and practice. This is, indeed, an important point to be made in 
the context of world-wide efforts to ‘internationalise’ or ‘globalise’ legal 
education, which often still have their primary focus on the introduction of 
mandatory international law elements in the curriculum,32 the development of 
experiential learning opportunities with a global dimension,33 or the boosting 
of the school’s offering in international student exchanges.34 Meanwhile, 
efforts are underway—with varying success—to include 
comparative/transnational law elements in the first-year law school 
curriculum.35 In my view, first-year law courses are the decisive laboratories for 
a radical transformation of legal education with a commitment to transnational 
legal thought. Rather than offering specialised seminars to those few students 
already interested in ‘international law’, the key will be to illustrate the 
transnationalisation of law at the heart of what is usually considered as law 
with a merely domestic scope. Such an enterprise requires substantive efforts on 
the part of professors and law schools. The former would have to sit down to 
review their course programs in a given area (say contracts, torts, property, 
constitutional) and identify cases or case studies with a transnational dimension. 
Such examples could receive a slightly expanded treatment in class, 
introducing students to a way of reading a case or approaching a legal 
regulatory challenge ‘in context’ and ‘in action’. Building on groundbreaking 
work in that regard,36 the present task consists in illustrating to students as 
future members of a transnational profession the radically expanding and 
evolving context of their work and of the cases they will be working on.37 
The next theme Professor Twining mentions concerns the unavailability of 
‘concepts and data to generalise about legal phenomena as a whole’. While that 
is true in a sense, it is also a considerable understatement, as Professor Twining 
is one who approaches and engages with the longstanding and emerging 
developments that bring lawyers in closer dialogue with political philosophers38 
and the ‘global justice’ thinkers building on that work,39 as well as with 
sociologists and legal pluralists who have been studying the world from a post-
national perspective with enormous curiosity and respect.40 So, while it is true 
not only that there are no one-size-fits-all concepts to make sense of 
globalisation but also that there cannot be such concepts, the task—as argued 
by Professor Twining in his Montesquieu Lecture, as well as in his 2000 
monograph Globalisation and Legal Theory41 and his 2009 magnum opus 
General Jurisprudence42—is one of a dedicated, interdisciplinary engagement 
in a methodological project. Laying down the epistemological foundations and 
defining the directions of this undertaking—in light of the fact that we are 
dealing with‘complex and bewildering processes’43 —are challenging tasks, as 
echoed by just about every contribution to this Symposium. Emerging from this 
engagement, however, is the impression that the reward is in the doing itself. 
The subsequent two themes—a critical engagement with and further expansion 
of comparative legal studies and the elaboration of ‘more sophisticated normative 
theories’—are in many ways connected to each other. Comparative law, since 
its inauguration at the World Congress in Paris in 1900, has seen a no less 
than breathtaking (if exasperating!44) process of experimentation and 
consolidation, interdisciplinary transformation, and apparently unending moments 
of self-doubt.45  Meanwhile, many of these woes seem to be directly related to 
the anxieties that accompany the erosion of belief systems and of models 
formerly held to be of a more stable and reliable nature.46 To me, crucial in this 
regard is Professor Twining’s insistence on the notion of ‘interdependence’, on 
recognising the challenge of normative and legal pluralism as existing in both 
spheres of the Global South and the Global North,47 and—importantly—as 
being a phenomenon which confronts us on the ‘sub-global’ level. 
 
A high proportion of processes loosely referred to as ‘global’ operate at more 
limited subglobal levels. These levels, insofar as they are spatial, are not nested 
in a single vertical hierarchy—galactic, global, regional, national, sub-state, local 
and so on. Interdependence is largely a function of proximity or closeness: 
proximity can be spatial (geographical contiguity), colonial, military, linguistic, 
religious, historical, or legal. In other words, a picture of patterns of law in the 
world needs to take account of regions, empires, diasporas, alliances, trading 
partners, pandemics, legal traditions and families. The British Empire, the 
Englishspeaking world, religious and ethnic diasporas, the common law world, ‘the 
Arab world’, even so-called ‘World Wars’ are all sub-global; so it is misleading to 
talk about them as if they apply to the world as a whole.48 
 
Sociologists, geographers and lawyers who are embracing a spatial conception 
of social order have pointed to the need to interrogate the legally fixed 
boundaries of competence, power and authority (jurisdiction) in order to pick 
up the actual dynamics of human (as well as institutional) interaction and the 
evolution of post-jurisdictional regimes in an effort to better understand and 
appreciate the artificial nature of boundaries that are drawn by legal rights.49 
As Professor Eve Darian-Smith, one of the contributors to this Symposium, 
has argued elsewhere: ‘In an attempt to transcend the artificiality of a 
global/local divide and the opening up of legal spaces previously unrecognized, 
new legal ethnographies suggest that the impact and production of 
globalization—however defined—occur within and without the formal 
boundaries of nation-states. Moreover, these studies indicate that in any 
examination of law and its relationship to globalization, analysis must take 
into account a range of theoretical perspectives and subject positions.’50 
The reciprocal deconstruction between a state-oriented comparatist agenda 
and a post-grand narratives51 search for normative theory/ies has significant 
echoes in the current troubles of adapting legal doctrine, theory and 
methodology to the ‘complex and bewildering processes’ of globalisation, 
processes—to be sure—that are grounded in a global social context and, by 
consequence, implicate stark degrees of winning and losing.52 In particular we 
are here concerned with the relationship between doctrinal claim making and 
empirical fact assessment, which informs the fifth and last theme in Professor 
Twining’s enumeration. In short, this theme is a rallying call to reinvigorate a 
type of socio-legal studies that was once at the forefront of legal theory and legal 
education reform, with a dedicated commitment to interdisciplinarity, 
empirical assessment and field work in an effort to study the actual processes 
of norm implementation and (the trials and tribulations of) legal change.53 It is 
here that an entire—and yet not entirely new—world seems to be opening up. 
The much discussed, more recent ‘empirical turn’ in law and international 
relations54 has its roots in a rich context of longer-coming approximations 
between law and social but also ‘hard’ sciences,55 specifically in the selfcritical 
assessment of law’s volatile knowledge basis.56 The promise lies in the embrace 
of this project on several methodological levels. The dynamic relations and, in 
fact, tensions between normative and legal pluralism at both supraand sub-state 
levels require a re-invigoration of legal theory as a historically informed, 
interdisciplinary engagement with law in a transnational context. Furthermore, 
the challenge consists in developing an approach that ties law’s present 
engagements with so-called globalisation processes back to the epistemological 
and structural challenges that law and legal decision-making have been facing 
all along. At the same time, it will be crucial to both draw on and yet relativise 
and update previous efforts of thinking, teaching and practising law as ‘law in 
context’. In other words, the transnationalisation of law unfolds against the 
background of decolonisation and in the midst of a wide ranging contestation of 
claims regarding an emerging ‘new world order’. By consequence, this 
constellation is, on the one hand, marked by the institutional disaggregation of 
nation-states and a crisis of nation-state-based models of legal-political power,57 
but at the same time we can witness a growing awareness of the need to 
radically de-centre and provincialise the Western legal imagination58 on the other. 
Against that background, a simple resort to a ‘social sciences’ approach to law 
and legal studies seems too weak. What today’s dynamic and empirically rich 
work on law, globalisation and post-colonialism shows is that a reinvigoration of, 
say, ‘law and society’ as a counterpoint to universalisation or ‘end of history’ 
accounts can only be successful if it challenges the mainstream not only on 
argumentative, ideological grounds but also through detailed ethnographic 
evidence that shows the inaccuracy and fallacy of abstract models regarding 
‘growth’, ‘modernisation’ or ‘democratisation’. At this point, we may have to 
recognise the potential for a renewal of sociological jurisprudence59 by short-
circuiting and approximating socio-legal studies under the umbrella of 
sociology of law, ‘law & society’ and so-called ‘new legal realism’.60 Given the 
enormous normative stakes of a legal-sociological analysis of transnational 
regulatory regimes, it is important to situate this legal theory project within 
the interdisciplinary global governance discourse, which is fuelled and driven by 
contributions from political scientists, sociologists, geographers and 
anthropologists. In this way, we would bring a renewed sociological 
jurisprudence closer to the vibrant research projects that are currently 
underway and which scrutinise the nature of global and transnational legal 
pluralism and the role of law in global governance overall and under specialised 
circumstances. Such an approach would seek to work out the contours and 
parameters of a concept of transnational legal pluralism which builds on 
earlier domestic and local forms of legal pluralism in the hope of adequately 
capturing and depicting the tensions between competing models of social ordering 
and problematising them in relation to evolving understandings of legal 
doctrine and legal theory.61 The methodological challenges of such an 
undertaking notwithstanding, it seems clear that questions of law’s selection of 
and interaction with ‘alternative knowledges’62 will define its—and our—
ability to carve out a place for ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in these challenging times 
and circumstances. Professor Twining’s scholarship on law and globalisation 
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